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# **HALF OF HUMANITY**

**Far Eastern Peoples and Problems**

By

**M. SEARLE BATES**

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*Ten Cents*

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## INTRODUCTORY NOTE

*If religious groups are to contribute constructively to the struggle for world order, we need to think through the meaning of our ideals in terms of the stubborn conditions of social life. These conditions vary greatly according to geographical location and historical development. The special problems of the different continents need to be taken into account, if plans for the organization of peace are to be fruitful. No set of problems is more difficult or more important than the complex issues in the Far East, that home of vast underprivileged peoples, unequally aroused by nationalist movements, now undergoing the sixth year of the war. In this introduction to the Far East, Dr. Bates presents some of the hard facts with which we need to reckon.*

*Dr. Bates writes with the authority of first-hand experience and careful study. Since 1920, he has been Professor of History at the University of Nanking, under the auspices of the United Christian Missionary Society. He was in charge of the University properties and relief activities during the terrible sack of China's capital by the Japanese in 1937-8. Because of his intimate knowledge of Far Eastern affairs, his counsel is in constant demand by learned societies and religious organizations. He is at present in the United States on leave of absence, serving as Far Eastern Consultant for the International Missionary Council.*

*The pamphlet deals with Far Eastern economic, political and cultural problems: first, in individual countries; second, within the area as a whole; and third, in relation to principles for a just peace. It does not attempt to work out the implications for religious study and action. That task is the challenge which is left with each church member and religious study group.*

RICHARD M. FAGLEY  
Education Secretary

# I. Far Eastern Peoples

"Half the world does not know how the other half lives." We need to know that other half of the human race in Eastern Asia. We need to know how the people live, how they want to live, if we are to be responsible citizens in an interdependent world. The perils of the present war, the hope of a just peace, the concern for the future of religious work in the Orient all underscore the importance of building a better understanding of the Far Eastern peoples and their problems. For their problems are also our problems. History has linked the fate of the East and the West.

What is the Far East? The term is commonly employed for the eastern mainland of Asia, plus the Philippine Islands and the Netherlands East Indies. Ordinarily it excludes Siberia, partly because that region is thinly developed, partly because it is inhabited by Russians whose life is centered in Europe rather than in Asia. Australia and New Zealand are excluded for comparable reasons.

India is not usually thought of as belonging in the Far East because of its intermediate location. Many of its people are Indo-European by race and language and it has been closely related with England. Moreover, modern communications and economic interchange between India and the Pacific shores of Asia have not been of major importance, though they tend to increase. Burma is not usually included in the Far East, partly because it does not touch the Pacific Ocean, but more soundly because of its long political connection with India. However, the people of Burma are racially akin to the Chinese and the Thais and in this present decade they have been separated from India. It may, therefore, be true that for the future Burma will be classified along with the Far Eastern grouping.

In the present study, therefore, the term *Far East* will ordinarily be used to include the territories which we know as China; Japan and Korea, with Manchuria and Formosa; British Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; Indo-China; the Philippine Islands; and Thailand. Burma and India will be considered as on the margins of the Far East.

## I. THE CHINESE

All of us are familiar with the type, location and enormous numbers of the people of China. Yet it is extremely difficult to gain an accurate idea of the extent of the territory and therefore of the significance of the population in relation to the land. Shall we include in the land of China the territories of Tibet and of Outer Mongolia, enormous in extent, which are not inhabited by the Chinese nor in reality controlled by them? Even the tremendous Chinese province of Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan), though within the formal administration of China, is in effect an outlying dependency less closely related with China proper than is Alaska with the forty-eight States.

If we consider the twenty-four provinces of China proper, we have an area equal to three-fifths of the continental United States, with a population density of 174 to the square mile. If we omit Sinkiang, the population per square mile is immediately raised to 241. Thus the geographical definition of China has great bearing upon the economic analysis of her position.

The lines of demarcation are vague in other ways. Although Manchuria is still recognized by the actions of the League of Nations and by the diplomatic practice of most countries as belonging to China, Japan has ruled it since 1931, as "Manchukuo." Yet the people of Manchuria are overwhelmingly Chinese, and there is strong reason to expect that it will again be found within Chinese territory at the close of the war. Formosa (Taiwan) is likewise inhabited by Chinese, though it was incorporated in the Japanese Empire in 1895.

The people of China proper number, according to the best of recent estimates and partial census figures, 450 million. The leading cities before the war were Shanghai with 3,500,000; Peking with 1,500,000; while Tientsin, Hong Kong (a city Chinese in population), and Nanking were all above 1,000,000, and Canton and Hankow approached that figure. Yet the cities are lost in a sea of rural communities. Some 85 per cent of the Chinese people live in farm villages or in small towns fully dependent upon agriculture for their existence. The Chinese population overseas, moreover, amounts to 7 million, or possibly even to 11 million if all categories of citizenship and all racial mixtures are included. Chinese are found by the million in Thailand and Malaya; by the hundreds of thousands in Indo-China and the Asiatic islands; besides considerable representation in Burma, the United States and Hawaii, and Canada.

On the other hand, although the Chinese people are relatively homogeneous in racial stock and in culture, there are, in the southern portions of the country, several million non-Chinese tribes often suggesting either Malayan or Tibetan connections. The well-known Tibetan, Mongol and Manchu stocks of the west and north are quite distinctive, but are so small in numbers as to play minor parts even if they are included in the Chinese picture.

## Farming on Half an Acre

Like his fellows elsewhere in Eastern Asia, the typical Chinese farmer is poor. Our country has nearly four acres of cultivated land per person of total population, while China has less than half an acre. For each person of our small farm population there are a full ten acres of cultivated land, but for each person of the Chinese farm families there is just one-sixteenth as much, or three-fifths of an acre. These figures stand for toil and for poverty, the struggle that peasants have carried on for unending centuries across the dusty plains, the eroded hills, and the tightly packed valleys of the Chinese earth. Fifteen hundred farm persons maintain themselves on the average square mile of crop area, which of course means fewer on the eroded land, and incredibly more upon the best rice country. The fundamental problem of the land may be shown in yet another way: the average Chinese farm household of 6.2 persons has 4.2 acres of land; the American counterpart of 4.2 persons has 157 acres of land.

Nearly three-fourths of the farm land of China is cultivated by the land owners, a little more than one-fourth by tenants. But the rent paid by tenant-farmers is commonly half the crop. The meager life enjoyed by Chinese farmers as a class means that the burden of rent is literally the price of health or life itself to many an individual in the tenant families. There are few farm animals, for they compete with men for vegetable food. The larger animals, such as cattle and buffaloes, are kept for draft purposes; but they number only 34 million, or eight for one hundred persons. Men do much of the plowing and the transporting.

The narrow margins of existence for the Asiatic peasant are demonstrated by analysis of Chinese farm diet. If 100 calories are distributed in the types of food used, we find that cereals account for 92 calories in China and for 38 in America; animal products for 2 in China and for 39 in America; vegetables for 5 in China and for 9 in



America; sugar and fruits together for less than 1 in China and for 13 in America. The Chinese have to live very largely upon grains, which represent the maximum in calories from a given unit of ground, while we can afford a varied diet.

## Handicaps for Industry

The movements of the present war, which have destroyed or transferred to Japanese hands the mines and the mills of North and East China, have aroused new concern for the industrial position and possibilities of that country. Thorough geological prospecting has been done in all likely localities, but with disappointing promise of mineral wealth. Almost all the minerals are represented in China, but most of them in tiny quantities. Antimony and tungsten are conspicuous because of their high rating in world supplies (70 per cent and 40 per cent of world production, respectively) ; yet after all they are minor metals. The iron of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia is of moderate quantity, but usually of poor quality; if it is added to the reserves of the other provinces, the total is less than 1 per cent of American reserves, and according to a high authority, would be consumed in a decade by American industry. Coal supplies in Manchuria and in Northwest China are reasonably satisfactory, but they are largely unsuitable for coking; and when placed over a denominator of 450 million they do not provide the basis for great industrial progress. Careful estimates place total Chinese coal reserves per capita at 1 to 3 per cent of the American reserves. Oil is expertly calculated at less than 1 per cent of American supplies in total bulk. There is a material basis for industrial progress in China, but not for expecting a high place in the world's iron age.

The actual development of modern industry in China up to the outbreak of war in 1937 was meager indeed. Chinese private and public enterprise was only beginning to make some headway against the established foreign enterprises in the treaty ports, and against the still older dependence upon imports of foreign industrial goods. Coal mines of modern type produced only 20 million tons a year, half of it from foreign-controlled mines. The larger iron mines were mostly in the hands of Japanese concerns, and 97 per cent of the ore output went to Japan on contract. Indeed, there were only two blast furnaces in China, working irregularly with a combined capacity of 120 tons a day. Thus there was almost no heavy industry, and the



promising beginnings in machine-making were operating with imported metals. New projects for iron and steel were under construction in 1937.

The chief advance was made in textiles, supported by the increase in domestic production of raw cotton, which in 1936 practically supplied the China mills. Imports of yarn almost ceased, and those of cloth were small. Textile mills employed half the registered factory workers of Shanghai. But the Japanese had gained mills much faster in China than did the Chinese themselves, by reason of greater and cheaper capital, partial escape from taxation, and superior technological backing by Japanese industry as a whole. The Chinese held only 43 per cent of the looms in their own country.

Chinese interests had partly asserted themselves in the fields of modern communications and banking, so long in foreign hands. True, foreign finance still exerted much influence in the railway field, and foreign companies controlled more than two-thirds of the steam tonnage in shipping. Foreign banks were powerful not only in foreign trade and in relation to foreign-operated industry, but also in Chinese enterprises, either directly or through the medium of Chinese banks. Nevertheless, the government's currency reforms of 1935; the increased activity of public and private Chinese banks; the construction of new railways, highways, telephone and radio networks; provision of rural credits and of scientific agricultural techniques — all betokened a new era of Chinese economic and governmental progress, stimulated by the Japanese threat and soon to be grievously damaged by the Japanese invasion.

## **Progress in Government**

The organization of China is in transition from the loose traditional system of family and village responsibility in local relationships, and from a somewhat passive paternalism on the part of the higher administration. Within one generation a body of modern, educated men, employing the techniques of new communications and of political forms adopted from the West, has endeavored to develop a government motivated by nationalism and seeking to organize the potential strength of the whole people. The process is only well begun.

China cannot be considered a democracy in present political attainment. Government on a national scale is formally in the hands of the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang), which carried through the latter stages of the political revolution begun by the overturn of the

Manchu Empire in 1911. In reality the government is a bureaucracy fairly well accepted and supported by the people, and directed by a group of leaders who came to the top in the revolutionary struggles. The spirit is bureaucratic and reformist rather than revolutionary or ideologically democratic. There is much, however, in the customs of local life and in the history and temper of the people, even in the thought of their political philosophers, that provides an excellent social base for democracy. Moreover, the present régime is introducing into several provinces a system of elective local government rising from the villages and the counties.

Chinese culture is limited by grinding poverty and by a massive illiteracy against which the present leaders are incessantly struggling. Some 25 million children and young people are now in regular schools and many millions more are undergoing special training in classes for adults and for shop apprentices. Upon this inadequate foundation, but with a great legacy from the past, China exhibits a culture remarkable for its emphasis upon the artistic quality of language, for high attainment in painting and in poetry, and for philosophy concerned above all with the ethical problems of human relationships. Chinese culture is essentially independent, although it received significant gifts brought from India by Buddhism and from Western Asia by Persians and by Turko-Mongolians. Chinese civilization in turn exerted tremendous influence upon all its neighbors in every direction, most spectacularly in the early development of Japan. It is to be hoped that the humane elements of Chinese culture can find helpful expression in the advance of the machine age, or at least can survive within the new era.

## 2. THE JAPANESE

Japan proper has an area about equal to that of Poland or to half of Montana, with a population of 70 million. The Japanese Empire, including Korea and Formosa but not the technically independent Manchukuo (Manchuria), has as much land as Texas and a population of 105 million. The crowding of people upon the main islands of Japan amounts to 474 persons per square mile, nearly eleven times the density shown by the American figure of 44. This is not the densest population in the world or even in Eastern Asia, but it is critical in its economic demands upon a vigorous and ambitious

people. Of all the countries in the Far East Japan is the only one which can be considered industrial. Of her population about 55 per cent are called urban and only 45 per cent rural. The movement toward industries is reflected in the growth of great cities. Tokyo alone comprises more than 7 million persons, as many as in New York City. Greater Osaka has more than 3 million and is comparable to Chicago in size. Nagoya, Kyoto, Kobe, and Yokohama all are above or near one million.

The rural elements only now are outnumbered by the industrial, though they have long since lost the control of economic policy. Only 16 per cent of the none-too-large area of the islands is cultivated, but more than half of that portion is irrigated for the intensive growing of rice with chemical fertilizer. The considerable mountainous regions are largely in productive forests. Half of all the farm holdings are under one and one-quarter acres; another fourth are less than two and one-half acres. There are 2 head of cattle for each 100 persons, as against 52 in America.

The distribution of land is inequitable, and problems of rent are critical. Eight per cent of owners have half the land; conversely, the lower half of owners hold only 9 per cent of the cultivated land. There are a full million non-cultivating landlords, many of them absentees. Rents are considered to be seven times those of England, or more than three times those of Germany. They usually amount to over half the crop, with no costs charged to the landlord save only the land tax. About 53 per cent of the cultivated area is tilled by owners, 47 per cent by tenants. In terms of agricultural households, 31 per cent are owners, 27 per cent are tenants, and 42 per cent are part-tenants who must apply to a landlord to supplement their own tiny plots. This rural feudalism helps to maintain a supply of cheap labor for household industries and for large factories. The poverty of tenant farmers and of common laborers in cities prevents the development of a real home market and sets industrial pressure for an abnormal export trade based on low labor costs.

Rural poverty is not identical with lack of food, and at times Japanese complaints and foreign sympathies have eclipsed the facts. In normal years Japan imports almost no food. Experts show that food production per capita has more than doubled while the population was doubling and there is much evidence to show that diet, height and weight have all improved in two generations. In 1927 an

exhaustive inquiry by the League of Nations, with the full cooperation of the Japanese government, resulted in this summary: "It cannot be claimed that there is any shortage in the quantity of food in Japan when the government statistics show a daily supply of three pounds of food per head."

Professor J. L. Buck, the best known authority on land utilization in China, has pointed out that the density of Japan's farm population is 1,300 per square mile of cultivated area, as against 1,500 in China. This comparison suggests a fair view of the Japanese position. Japan is among the most crowded lands of the world, and is not among those best endowed with natural resources. She has needed and will again need economic cooperation from the more fortunate lands, like our own, and has a case against our tariffs and other restrictive policies. Japan does *not* have a sound case for the subjection of neighbors meagerly supplied by nature and actually much less prosperous than herself. All of this takes into little account the great advantages acquired by Japan in her taking of Formosa, Korea, Manchuria, and other territories. "Lack of opportunity" may be answered in the words of Hugh Byas, filled with competent knowledge of Japan: "No other nation in Asia and few anywhere are able to show such a growth of wealth and power as Japan has achieved within one lifetime."

## Industrial Growth

In 1936, the year before the war, Japan was producing (in her own islands, Korea, and Manchuria) 96 per cent of the coal she used; 62 per cent of the copper; 100 per cent of the silk and rayon; 70 per cent of the wood pulp; 30 to 40 per cent of tin, zinc, aluminum, salt. Of the coal, 92 per cent was produced in the home islands. On the other hand, she imported 81 per cent of the iron ore used in Japan; 91 per cent of the oil; all of the nickel and wool and almost all of the rubber and cotton. There was no significant restriction upon her securing these raw materials abroad until 1941 when her wars and expansion, combined with the economic effects of the European war, brought sharp limitations. Nor was there extraordinary difficulty in paying for the imports by ordinary trading processes, if one makes reasonable allowance for the international depression after 1930, from which Japan recovered more promptly and adequately than any other commercial nation.

The general picture of Japanese industrial and trading progress is one of remarkable speed in achievement. In the 1930's Japan took Britain's sovereign place as the prime exporter of cotton goods, and was first supplier of miscellaneous manufactures to the Orient. Heavy industry was pushed ahead for military reasons. Larger units were forged among and alongside the host of small establishments long characteristic of Japanese manufacturing. State control and participation had gone far, even before the war.

## Cultural Veneer

The Japanese people are homogeneous in their present racial character, though they appear to be in origins a mixture of the Mongol type from China and Korea, with the Malayan type which came northward along the islands from the Philippines and Formosa. It is not adequately understood in this country that the Japanese in culture and in language were entirely distinct from the Chinese, and only in the fifth and later centuries of our era did they acquire in rather wholesale fashion a covering of Chinese civilization. The only similarity in language between the two peoples is that the Japanese attempted to record their own very different speech by the use of ill-suited Chinese characters. From early times there has been a peculiar situation of cultural debt and cultural strain: importation and adaptation of literature and art forms, with appreciation for classical China; but also, outbreaks of self-assertive reaction against the larger neighbor.

Japan has not provided creative achievements of new forms of culture as has China, but she has attained high quality in painting and the decorative arts, often with significant variations from the Chinese originals. In philosophy and religious thought it appears to non-Japanese that the civilization of Japan has been relatively deficient. Literature tends to be picturesque rather than profound. The Japanese traits of cultivated admiration for natural beauty, for order and for cleanliness result in attractive homes, as well as in an education distinctively directed to include these qualities. Japan has achieved practically universal literacy in a complete system of primary schools, though the provision of education above the sixth grade is sadly inadequate to the needs and demands of the people. Social discipline and training in devotion to the Imperial State are major purposes of education.



All are familiar with the imperial government of Japan in which the person of the Emperor and his ancestors are regarded as the representatives of deity at the head of the nation. Modern government in Japan has attempted at once to use the prestige and tradition of the imperial family with the administration of a modern and centralized type which can organize to the full the last person and the last resources of the land. The prestige of military leaders, playing upon the long feudal history of the country, has enabled them to seize the positions of authority in which they could employ the Emperor's name, and at the same time dominate the great bureaucracy. It has been rightly said that Japan was totalitarian before that word was known in Europe. True, the completeness of wartime organization is due to concentrated effort, with some instruction from the German example; but historically there have been no limits in principle to the authority of the Emperor and of those who rule by its shadow.

### 3. THE KOREANS

The Koreans number some 23 million, largely peasants and common laborers, dominated by the Japanese economic and political régime. Some 77 per cent of the population is reported as agricultural, with only 4 per cent engaged in mining and industry, including domestic handicrafts. Although mining and lumbering industries are important in the economic statistics of Korea, they are extractive industries alone and to a very small degree provide commodities for the use of the people of Korea. The Japanese have provided fairly good communications and a basis for health services. All of the elements of poverty which have been mentioned in the case of the Chinese and the Japanese farmers are found in Korea, with the additional pressure of a class of Japanese landlords imposed upon the Korean tenants and even over Korean land owners. The situation is so bad that the Japanese government no longer reports figures on the Japanese ownership of land, nor indeed any statistics of landlordism. As far back as 1932, of all farm households 53 per cent were tenants and 25 per cent semi-tenants, according to the government reports. A remarkable commentary upon the economic struggle in Korea is the fact that there are fewer Japanese, despite extraordinary inducements, who have gone to Korea to live than there are Koreans who have gone, despite intermittent restrictions, to work in the fac-

tories of Japan. The average gross income for a farm family is 500 *yen*, one third the figure for a Japanese farm family.

Naturally there is sympathy among the Chinese and among many Westerners with the desire of certain Koreans to reestablish independence of their country. However, it must be said that it will be very difficult for the Koreans to supply the technical and executive skill needed to maintain an independent economic life, and still more difficult to provide the political leadership for a people long ruled by others. Excluding the great governmental enterprises, and also private companies incorporated in Japan, Korean companies had in 1938 only 11 per cent of the capital corporately invested in their country. Practically no opportunities for higher education have been opened to Koreans during the two generations in which many Japanese have had such chances. In recent years the Korean language has been blotted out as a means of education even from the lower years of the primary school. Strong efforts have been made to Japanize the Koreans, including now the introduction of Shinto shrines and ceremonies and the required acceptance of the Japanese god-shelf in ordinary homes. Thus Koreans have been denationalized and cut off from their own culture, dominated and denied opportunity to such a degree that independence is almost impossible at the moment it comes near.

#### 4. THE CHINESE OF FORMOSA

It has been frequently observed that Formosa is the exhibit *par excellence* of intensive economic imperialism. Japan has vigorously developed the island as a source of rice and sugar for the home country. Since 1900 the rice area has been doubled and the total production of rice quadrupled, with half the crop going to Japan. Formosa supplies 90 per cent of the sugar used within the Empire, at double the price of Java sugar, and with great profit to Japanese interests which control the processing, transportation and distribution. Industry is largely limited to general agriculture and to the processing and servicing of food products.

Although the Chinese are nineteen in every twenty persons on the island, and do most of the farming and other physical work, their share in the income and management is small indeed and has been steadily decreasing, according to Japanese statistics. The Chinese part in total corporate capital, private and public, is now barely 5



per cent. Wages are less than half those of Japan. In Formosa, 99 per cent of the Japanese children are in school; 50 per cent of the Chinese children. Latterly all education and publication in the Chinese language has had to give way to Japanese; and Chinese are practically barred from normal and higher schools.

## 5. THE PEOPLE OF MALAYA

The Malay or Indonesian race is an important body of people, now found in small numbers on the Malay Peninsula and in larger groups upon the islands of the East Indies and the Philippines. British Malaya is a highly anomalous grouping of people in an economy which is stranger than fiction. The land comprises only 5 million people, of whom less than half are Malays and even among these are many immigrants from Thailand and the Indies who do not regard the Malay States as their home. Some 40 per cent of the total population is Chinese and 14 per cent is Indian. Thus two alien races comprise the majority of the inhabitants. It is almost impossible to think of a stable political order without the supervision of some external authority. The Malays as found near Singapore are peculiarly unaggressive and rather indolent persons. Though likable in certain personal qualities, they have failed to produce a single outstanding individual.

The Chinese have entered the country not merely for general trade as they have in most of the lands of Eastern Asia, but also to operate rubber plantations, tin mines, and other productive enterprises. The leading Chinese financiers and industrialists of Singapore are the most wealthy of their race in any land. The Indians are found in a few lines of trade, but they have come chiefly to serve as laborers in the rubber plantations. In this small population of 5 million Singapore looms abnormally large as a great trading, shipping and manufacturing center. Malaya produces hardly one-third of the rice needed to maintain its laborers. Indeed, 65 per cent of the crop land grows rubber, while nut trees for industrial oils take up much of the remainder. Thus the people of Malaya can live only by the constant importation of rice and other foods from adjacent lands.

An interesting feature of Malayan economy is the degree of participation by Asiatics in economic development. More than one-half of the rubber produced is controlled by Orientals, chiefly Chinese. Iron, manganese and bauxite are mined entirely by Japanese interests

for export to Japan. The strategic value of Malayan raw materials has been brought home to all of us by the course of the war. During 1940 Malaya produced 37 per cent of the world's tin and 39 per cent of the crude rubber. The importance of these Malayan raw materials to American economic life is disproportionately great. In the period 1936-38 American imports from Malaya surpassed in value those from the United Kingdom; while our exports to Malaya were only 2 per cent of those to the United Kingdom.

## 6. THE INDONESIANS

Far more significant in terms of people and indeed in terms of total economy are the inhabitants of the Netherlands East Indies, increasingly called Indonesians. They number 68 million, dwelling upon a territory almost the size of the United States east of the Mississippi. The density of population is therefore 93 per square mile — about double our own. But this figure hides the peculiar character of the East Indies, a character which in varying forms appears again in the Philippines and in Thailand. In fact, most of the population is crowded upon a minor area of rice-growing land. Java alone, with its satellite Madura, contains 41 million people in the small area of 51,000 square miles — a little larger than the state of Pennsylvania. This means a density of 818 persons per square mile, nearly double that of Japan and in reality the highest density of any considerable population in the entire world. By contrast, the so-called outer provinces, of which Sumatra and Borneo are the most significant, contain hardly 18 million people in an area so vast that the density per square mile is 28, less than in the United States.

Nine-tenths of the Indonesians are Mohammedans, with some influences from Arab culture, which from the thirteenth century began to overlay an earlier stratum of Hindu influence. The Indonesians comprise half the pilgrims to Mecca, and maintain there a colony of 10,000 residents. Yet Islam is less intense and intolerant among the East Indians than in India or the Near East. Artistic handicrafts are characteristic of the regional culture, rather than great architecture, painting or literature.

The population of the Netherlands East Indies is considered to be more than 90 per cent rural. The greatest city, Batavia, has fewer than a half million inhabitants. Java and certain portions of the other islands concentrate upon the production of rice and other foods for

the local population. On the outer islands, however, and in restricted portions of Java there have been many Dutch-managed estates devoted to the production of rubber and of sugar for export. The great development of the sugar industry in Java brought to the people of that country extreme distress in the depression of the 1930's. The area devoted to sugar had to be cut down five-sixths, and millions of people were seriously affected. This problem is a striking illustration of the economic interdependence of the world and of the necessity for world-wide cooperation in order that such terrific shocks may be mitigated. After partial recovery, the East Indies produced 5 per cent of the world's sugar. They also accounted for 37 per cent of all rubber, 28 per cent of all coconut products, 22 per cent of agave and sisal fiber, 18 per cent of tea, 6 per cent of coffee, 75 per cent of kapok, 80 per cent of pepper, 90 per cent of quinine.

### Treasure-House of Materials

On Sumatra and other islands there have been developed significant industries of oil, tin (18 per cent of the world's production), bauxite and other minerals. There is coal, but not for coking, and iron in large deposits as yet untouched, reported to be of medium grade. The Netherlands East Indies have thus become one of the important producing areas of the world, able to supply to other countries a surplus both of agricultural and mineral materials; and they are capable of moderate industrialization. The standard of living of the ordinary peasant is low. Nevertheless, there have been signs of distinct improvement in hygiene, a gradual extension of education and some advance in factory employment. Before the Japanese invasion textile mills were able practically to meet domestic demand, and few *sarongs* were imported. Java provides an outstanding instance of increase in population as economic opportunities develop and the conditions of life are not too severe. In 1815 Java contained fewer than 5 million people; within 130 years the population has become eight or nine times as large.

The Netherlands East Indies are notable among colonial areas in the East by reason of the relatively large number of Europeans, chiefly Dutch, who have come to live in the colony and to identify themselves with its life. In certain aspects this process makes for stability because it provides a point of common interest between an important body of Westerners and the local Asiatics. In the case of

the Dutch there is also considerable freedom from race prejudice in regard to intermarriage. Here again there is potential growth of common interest, though the Eurasians tend to be cut off both from the Dutch and from the local peoples, despite their legal assimilation to the Dutch. Moreover, the group of Dutchmen who have resided for one or more generations in the East Indies and built up a type of vested interest, have at times been less liberal than the ruling Netherlands in Europe. Administrative and political opportunities have been given to the Indonesians with cautious moderation. A carefully balanced *Volksraad* (People's Council) is far from controlling the centralized executive. Be that as it may, when the European war broke in 1939-40, it was relatively easier for the Netherlands East Indies to continue on a basis of practical autonomy than was the case for certain other colonial domains of European nations. The Dutch have invested in the East Indies seven times as much as Americans have in the Philippines — in communications, utilities, irrigation works and mining installations, as well as in industrial establishments. Educational progress has been meager.

## 7. THE INDO-CHINESE

The people of Indo-China number 24 million, as many as there are in Spain. Their territory is larger than that of France, or equal to the size of Texas. Buddhism is the prevailing religion, less vigorous than in Burma or Thailand. The Indo-Chinese people are made up of varied groups, more or less closely related to the Southern Chinese. They are almost wholly peasants, crowded on to the rice lands of the great river valleys. Only 8 per cent of the entire country is cultivated and large areas of hills are uninhabited except for forest hunters. Indo-China, like Thailand, is sometimes called a country of monoculture since five-sixths of the cultivated land is planted with rice. Rice constitutes nearly half the value of exports, and rubber one-fourth. There is a very high percentage of peasant ownership, reaching over 90 per cent in most districts. But about half of the farms are under one acre in size and the life of the peasant is grim indeed. The French administration has assisted somewhat with improved irrigation and some provision of chemical fertilizers. Strange as it may seem, the people who live in the densely occupied lowlands of Tonkin in the north are seldom willing to migrate to fairly open country in the south.

The hills of Indo-China contain many minerals which are increasingly drawn upon by modern methods. The resources do not appear to be great, but for the present period coal, tin, gold and iron are profitable extractions from the earth. About 75 per cent of the coal, much of it good anthracite, is exported — chiefly to Japan and China. There is little manufacturing since the French have followed a conservative economic imperialism designed to maintain the Indo-Chinese market for their own textiles and household articles. However, high French tariffs and native poverty have combined to support the old handicrafts, upon which a full million persons depend entirely for their living, and many farm families in part. French policy has not contemplated even half-measures of self-government, and the colony is ruled under close instructions from Paris, as an integral part of the French economic system. French culture is displayed and has considerable prestige. But there is slight effort to provide educational opportunities for the Indo-Chinese.

## 8. THE FILIPINOS

The Philippine Islands provide for 17 million people, as many as in Egypt or Turkey, upon an area equivalent in size to Italy or Nevada. This means a density of 140 persons per square mile, largely concentrated upon the wet lands of Luzon. The great island of Mindanao is sparsely occupied. The predominant racial stock is Malay. Spanish and Chinese *mestizos* number almost a million, and hold most of the wealth and power. The economic life of the Filipinos bears signs of less serious effort than is the case among many of the peasant peoples of the Far East. For instance, there is less irrigation and that mainly by natural streams. There is a tendency to indolence which is marked among the peoples of the towns, though it should not be charged too heavily against the men of the farms. Despite the fact that cultivation is less thorough than in some neighboring countries, three-fifths of the Filipino farms are smaller than two and a half acres. About 75 per cent of the farms are operated by their owners and thus the problem of tenancy is acute among only a minority. Debts are a more serious economic problem, because the cultivator is often in debt to the *cacique*, who controls assessments and local politics. Quasi-slavery is not rare, when debts cannot be repaid.

In recent years the progress of mining, particularly of gold, iron, copper, chromium, silver and manganese has brought startling devel-



opment to the finances of the Philippines, though it has not benefited a large number of laborers. The reserves of good iron are small, and coal mines do not provide an eighth of the present low consumption. Great industry is not to be anticipated. While nearly 70 per cent of the population gain their living in some manner from sugar, coconuts, hemp and tobacco which figure largely in exports, about 18 per cent of the imports are in foods. Philippine economy is closely linked with that of the United States, largely because of long enclosure within one tariff wall and partly because of American investment in the islands. During recent years some 75 per cent of Philippine imports have been drawn from the United States. This excessive dependence of Filipino life upon American commercial and industrial connections is rightfully a matter of great concern to Philippine statesmen. American capital has all the gold and chromium, 75 per cent of the embroidery, 40 per cent of the public service enterprises, half the sawmills, and a third of the sugar centrals. Filipino capital, however, controls over half the sugar centrals, and 40 per cent of the cordage. Spanish concerns hold 60 per cent of the tobacco industry; and Chinese hold all the rice mills.

During nearly 400 years of Spanish rule and more particularly during the forty-odd years of American rule, the Filipinos have become the most Westernized of all the peoples of Southeast Asia. But even with the expenditure of 20 per cent of all revenues upon education, over half the population remains illiterate, and only a third of the children of school age are actually attending school. The average period of attendance is less than three years. There are few newspapers, nor is public opinion highly developed. For so long there was only one side of one issue to talk about — independence — that skillful organization and leadership have been able to maintain one predominant party without real rivals. The incompleteness of democracy requires no comment.

The initial American pledge to prepare the Filipinos for independence and the fairly rapid, if irregular, steps toward it, are comparatively creditable. The variations introduced by American pressure groups for their own economic interests are less meritorious. Nor should we so lightly use the example of the Philippines to berate others, for we have not given tariff powers to the Filipinos as the British have given them to the Burmese; and our reservations of ultimate executive powers are similar to those maintained in Burma.

## 9. THE THAI

Long called by Westerners the Siamese, the Thai prefer the name of the tribes which largely constitute their population, immigrants from Southern China. The people number 15 million upon an area of more than 200,000 square miles. Thus their country is as large as France and considerably bigger than California. Nine-tenths of the land does not produce farm crops, but is used for fuel, building material and, to a lesser extent, for hunting. The hill country, particularly to the north and east, is sparsely inhabited, while the alluvial plains are densely crowded with teeming rice fields. Again, as in Indo-China, other crops are almost insignificant in the presence of rice, which fills 94 per cent of the cultivated area. Perhaps 80 per cent of cultivated land is worked by those who own it, although the government's statistics are inadequate.

Thailand has in recent years begun to produce for export tin (9 per cent of the world figure) and rubber. But the country still relies upon its great surplus of rice as a major means of buying what it needs from abroad. There is no concentration of industry, yet small-scale manufacture is strongly represented in the surprisingly large city of Bangkok, which has nearly a million people. In Thailand there is no oil and almost no iron; poor lignite; little water power. Heavy industry is beyond possibility.

After a painful history of foreign encroachment upon the internal life of the country, Thailand took advantage of the Wilsonian doctrines and of moderation on the part of her imperial neighbors, Britain and France, to bargain for a political and financial independence formally complete. When the new constitutional regime of 1932 acquired power, the country's business was overwhelmingly in foreign hands. The Thai government has attempted to assert its national claims to a high degree, not merely as a reaction against resented neighbors, but also as a means of rallying the people to support the government in a new course of self-development. The actual progress of the new program is not startling, but Westerners who have lived in sympathetic contact with the Thai officials feel that the old tradition has beneficially given way to the new. The power of the conservative Buddhist priesthood and of the reactionary nobility has been definitely challenged. As late as 1934 it was considered that 95 per cent of the electorate were illiterate. Strenuous efforts have brought some 40 per cent of the children into school,



chiefly for the first two grades; and formal literacy is now reported for the nation at 31 per cent.

If not a bright light of example for other peoples of rising national ambitions, Thailand nevertheless supplies in Southeastern Asia the one instance of a nation that has been able to maintain a precarious independence and even to enlarge its measure of independence until the very eve of the Japanese onslaught.

## 10. THE BURMESE

The Burmese people are similar in numbers to the Filipinos and the Thai, approximately 16 million. Of this population two-thirds are Burmese proper, racially close to the Chinese and the Thai; and one-third are hill tribes or Indian and Chinese immigrants. However, there has been until recently very little racial or cultural friction and many of the minority groups have adopted in part the Burmese language and social customs. Burma is a fairly large country, almost the size of Texas. Three-fifths of the land is covered with forests which are profitable both to the government and to private enterprise. The northern portions of the country are mountainous and well wooded. These are called Upper Burma, while Lower Burma is the term applied to the southern plains and river valleys. Burma is fertile and so well watered that it has never known crop failure or famine. The area of cultivated land has been greatly extended during the past fifty years, providing up to the present a fairly comfortable size of holding for the Burmese farmer. We have no complete figures for Lower Burma, where there are some large estates with many tenants. In Upper Burma most of the farms run from 5 to 15 acres.

This strongly agricultural population relies heavily upon rice. During the past decade Burma has exported in the average year 3,500,000 tons of rice, which is more than equal to the combined total exports of Thailand and Indo-China, her chief competitors. The rice has gone primarily to India, to Europe and the United Kingdom, but Japanese buying has been irregularly heavy and quantities also have moved to Ceylon and the Straits Settlements. In Upper Burma the chief agricultural products are oil seeds, legumes and cotton.

Although the condition of the Burmese peasant is relatively high among his Far Eastern neighbors, he has suffered from the violent economic changes and political uncertainties of recent years. When depression lowered the price of rice by 60 per cent, Indian money

lenders foreclosed on half the land in Lower Burma. Thus the years 1930 to 1935 were a social revolution. Latterly, however, the separation of Burma from India and the growth of Burmese national action to limit the economic power of Indians in their country have caused the money lenders to sell out their farms lest they lose all. Fundamental to the debt problem is the buoyant, carefree temperament of the people, "the Irish of the East." It is said that less than 10 per cent of loans to farmers are actually spent for agricultural purposes. The abilities of the Burmese seem to be manual and mechanical, rather than commercial.

Burma has profited from the development of the oil fields of North Burma, from the historic mining of gems; and, in times of high world prices, from the extraction of lead, tin, silver, tungsten and zinc. Burma has practically no coal or iron, however, and there is no prospect for the development of heavy industry. The oil production is less than one-half per cent of the world figure and the total income from minerals is small compared with that from agriculture.

## **The Shadow of Buddha**

Burmese culture is marked by the dominance of Buddhism which has strenuously maintained itself against the invasion of modern tendencies. The influence of 125,000 monks and of 20,000 informal but fairly effective monastic schools is the social core of the power of Buddhism. The introduction of modern music, world literature, and the material equipment of modern cities has affected deeply the more progressive elements of the population. There have been regrettable declines, however, in domestic crafts and in native arts.

The Burmese have the highest percentage of literacy in the Far East after Japan, though it must be admitted that the actual reading standards of the literate are low. About 40 per cent of the population can read and write. Three-eighths of the young children are in regular schools, not counting the casual attendance at monastic schools. Higher education and technical training appear adequate to the general development of the country.

In the period 1935-37 the long association of Burma with India was definitely broken. The present Burmese constitution is a lengthy supplement to the Government of India Act, passed by the British Parliament in 1935. The constitution provides for all government save defense, foreign affairs and monetary policy to be in the hands


of Burmese ministers responsible to an elected legislature. Important emergency powers are reserved for the executive to use when necessary, but they are seldom called upon and the constitution has been worked as a genuine program for government by the Burmese. Dominion status has been declared as the proximate goal of current political advance. Certain Burmese leaders, however, insist on absolute and immediate independence.


## II. THE SOUTHEASTERN PEOPLES

The peoples of Southeastern Asia are less distinctively familiar than those of China, Japan and India, and it may be well to present a general view which will gather up the individual pictures just completed. The several countries are similar in their tropical or semi-tropical climate; in the primacy of agriculture and reliance upon rice for food; in their usual lack of coal, iron and capital adequate for heavy industry; in their disinclination to commerce; in their simple family and village organization, now in certain places radically affected by economic change; in absence of caste and of local rulers or aristocracies strong enough to lead effective resistance against change; in basic animistic beliefs, overlaid among some groups by Buddhist, Hindu, Islamic or Confucian culture.

With specific qualifications noted earlier, the economic life, administrative system and inter-land relations of this area have been determined by imperial powers centered in Europe and America. Policies of investment, transport, health and education have been directed in the main toward securing for the industrialized powers such raw materials as they desired. Purchasers' demand, more than the military or political interests of the controlling power, has determined the flow of raw materials. In the large, there has been free access to raw materials — without assurance of peace or of welfare. There have been some gains in welfare for the peoples of the area, but no marked improvement of the living conditions of the masses.

Variations of policy among the imperial powers are noticeable. The United States in the Philippines proceeded rapidly toward the announced goal of self-government, aided by the politics of depression. More trust was put in education than in economic development and social welfare; with results not gloriously satisfactory. Incorporation in the American economic system has worked counter to the political program of preparation for independence.







The British goal in Burma and India has gradually evolved as dominion status within the Empire. Public works and other economic development to provide the foundation for financing welfare and educational enterprises, with considerable emphasis on public health, are typical British procedure. Partial tariff control has been granted to the area governments. Caution is maintained in defense, foreign relations, justice and police. Dutch policy has been like the British, but still more reserved. It has been excellent in economic improvement, meager in educational progress. France has not looked to colonial self-government, and her centralized system has inclined toward economic monopolies serving immediate French interests.

## Asiatic Nationalism

Nationalism is still the active affair of very small minorities, though mild emotional support is given them by larger numbers. The gradual acquisition of skills in modern techniques and organization is the basis for the growth of ambition and resentful self-reliance among those who have been close to the profits and ease and power of the resident imperialists. The Japanese victory in 1905, the destructive wars of Westerners among themselves, the impulses to local industry from war periods and from the great depression, all have assisted the growth of nationalism in varied ways. The influence of Chinese, Japanese and Indian progress and ideas is great; but still more important are the Western concepts and procedures, demonstrated on the spot among the Western communities, and taught by schools, publications, missionary efforts, movies and radio.

Just now there is an unforgettable demonstration of what one Asiatic nation can do against Westerners in combination, wrecking and acquiring in a flash all the labor of their decades and centuries. Only the Japanese excesses of ambition, pride and greed permit to Westerners the chance of regaining some fraction of respect and co-operation from other Asiatics; and the respect must be earned, as never before. With all its limitations and possible vices, nationalism is the only hope of developing in Southeastern Asia effective community wills, able to tackle the appalling problems which confront those peoples. They have their own natural divisions complicated by the separate economic and social interests of Westerners, Eurasians, and Asiatic immigrants. Unified action in the general or majority interest of the nation is the pearl of great price.

## 12. THE INDIANS

The Indian people are sufficiently varied to represent a whole continent. They are twice as numerous as the people of all Africa and they constitute a body of racial elements, languages, religions, and castes, which is one of the most complex in the world. Some 353 million live upon a territory three-fifths the size of the United States. Of these people a majority, whatever may be their shade of brown or black, are of the Indo-European race descended from immigrants of the Persian type. The Indo-Europeans or Aryans, however, are intermingled with many other racial groups. South India is largely peopled by the Dravidians, one of the so-called brown races, related more or less closely to the Malay type and to the islanders of the Pacific.

The Indian people are strongly rural. Only two cities in that vast population have attained the number of a million persons — Calcutta and Bombay. Only four others are above 400,000 — Madras, Hyderabad, Delhi and Lahore. The census classifies 70 per cent of the entire population as living directly from agriculture. Many of the others are concerned with local transport, village trade, and the processing of farm products.

The major products of the Indian land are rice, wheat, cotton, jute, and oil seeds. It is noteworthy that two or even three of these leading products are industrial in character; indeed if we examine Indian industries, particularly from the point of view of the number of persons employed in them, we find them closely connected with farm production. First come the cotton and jute mills, then coal mining, and the processing of tea and sugar. Next in rank is transportation, and then mining and metallurgic industries. Again, in terms of exports, we see even more clearly the ascendancy of agriculture. The five most important items are jute, cotton, tea, seeds, and hides. Yet we should misrepresent the economic character of India if we ignore the significant progress in modern industry. Mines produce great quantities of coal and important values in manganese, gold, mica, oil, salt, copper, and iron in that order. On the basis of this extractive industry India has built an economy which ranks eighth among the countries of the world in industrial production.



## Religious Communities

The culture of India requires an encyclopedia rather than a paragraph. More than 200 languages are known by qualified investigation and more than 2,000 castes constitute significant groups in society. In few countries of the world does religion play so large a part as in India. The sense of community, the standards of moral and social life, much of the literature and the art — all are found in a religious setting. The Hindus, the characteristic indigenous religious body, feel that no one can leave the Hindu religion without cutting himself off completely from Indian humanity. Their view is based upon the premeating character of Hinduism in the lives of its adherents.

Although the Hindus number in all a full two-thirds of the people of India, the Mohammedans constitute 80 millions, enough for several nations in some other parts of the world. The Mohammedans of India hold less to the stern separatism of their brethren to the west, yet they tend to remain a community apart with a complete life of their own. Important smaller religious groups run to several millions each and yet are easily lost in the great mass of India.

The characteristic literature and thought of India derive from the religious epics of pre-Christian centuries and are ill-adapted to the demands of modern society. Cultural adaptation is limited by the class interest of the Brahmans, who desire to maintain their priestly and social prestige. Nevertheless, the gradual introduction of modern government, modern industry, modern transportation, schools open without discrimination, has collectively brought about a mixing of castes and groups which has opened the way for a new society. In the great poverty and conservatism of India, literacy has been attained by only eleven per cent of the people, including very few women and girls. There are now fourteen million young people in regular schools, of whom hardly two million are girls. There are eighteen universities and many colleges, with a fair number of technical and vocational institutes. Indian education has been criticized for developing an abnormal proportion of high training and failing to devote enough government expenditure and effort to the extension of elementary education. However, it must be said that the universities have enabled Indians to secure an education that fits them reasonably well for governmental and professional advancement in all types of services and organizations.

## Struggle for Freedom

The British rule in India has done a good deal to meet the national desires by the large degree of Indianization of governmental services. In the elaborate reorganization of 1935 practically complete self-government was granted to the provincial régime, with a similar program for a federal system, if Indians would themselves agree upon the major issues involved. But development was blocked by twin barriers: (1) the insistence of important Indian leaders upon unconditional independence as the prerequisite to their taking any sort of public responsibility; (2) the divisions of Hindu and Mohammedan political organizations, with further dissidence by the rulers of some of the native states and by minor socio-religious groups. British action has usually been tardy and qualified, even when credit should be given for wisdom in striking the main course.

On the other hand, the intolerant predominance of Hinduism rightly gives pause to the 80 million Mohammedans and others who feel that they may be left to the mercies of Hindu intransigence. Many of the Hindu leaders will agree to no stipulations for protecting the interests of minorities, and silence all protests with the shout for a unified, independent India, as against what they describe as an India kept dependent by divisions which the British foster for their own purposes. Certain important Mohammedans insist upon the creation of a separate Moslem state, as preferable to risking their community life under an aggressive Hindu government determined to assimilate them. They declare that they will oppose by force any system put upon them against their will. Attempts at fraternization between Hindus and Moslems have gained only moderate success. Small minorities and the more conservative of the princes fear destruction of their interests, and even the 50 million outcastes are anxious. Lack of agreement among Indians left vacant the council hall which would properly have decided the relation of India to the present war. Though opposing the Japanese purposes and methods, many Indian leaders refuse openly to assist a war effort officially determined by the British. Political cooperation on the higher levels is scanty in the hour when it is most needed by India, by Great Britain, by China and the United Nations generally.

## II. Problems in the Far East

The Far Eastern lands proper contain almost exactly 700 million people. When Burma and India are added, the total is raised to about 1,070 million. This is half the population of the world. Here is the fundamental importance of the Far East for world peace.

The Chinese alone are three times as numerous as the people of the whole of North America, and the Indians are twice as numerous. Again, the Chinese alone are equal to the population of the whole of Europe. The peoples of the smaller countries of the Far East are almost equal to the entire population of North and South America taken together.

It is obvious that among the peoples we have considered, the Chinese and the Japanese are the leading groups in the Far East proper — the Chinese by reason of their population, culture, significance and international position; the Japanese because of their effective organization, their unmatched industrial development, and their universal education. The southeastern groups, the Netherlands East Indies, Indo-China, the Philippine Islands, Thailand, and British Malaya, with or without Burma, have thus far been separate entities in their formal organization. Our brief survey of their conditions of life, however, indicates many similarities in their problems as peasant peoples recently the subject of commercial, industrial and political activity by Western nations.

India stands somewhat apart both by geography and by distinctive characteristics, but one should always recall the Indian contributions made through Buddhism to the culture of China and Japan; through Buddhism and Hinduism, to the countries of the Malay Peninsula, and even to the Netherlands East Indies. Another common element is found in the spread of Islam not only to many parts of India and to western parts of China, but also to the tip of the Malay Peninsula, to most of the Netherlands East Indies, and northward to the margins of the Philippine Islands. A third connecting link among several territories lies in the Chinese and Indian migrations. Chinese are important in the trade and other economic activities of all the southeastern lands. Indians are financial leaders in Burma and play a significant part in British Malaya.

## I. INTERNATIONAL TRADE

It has been shown that, with the partial exception of Japan, the living standards of the Far Eastern peoples are low. In some aspects, therefore, their economic place in the world is far smaller than their population would imply. The raw materials of the Far East, however, have superlative importance. Professor Spykman of Yale in his valuable recent study, *America's Strategy in World Politics*, has analyzed the supplies of ten different strategic raw materials; antimony, chrome, mica, tin, tungsten, manila fiber, quinine, rubber, silk, wool. He finds that we must import all or practically all of our supplies of these materials, save for some domestic production in mica, tungsten and wool. Of the imports of these strategic materials, 77 per cent come from across the Pacific; only 12 per cent from trans-Atlantic sources; only 11 per cent from other nations of the Western Hemisphere. In fact, all of our manila fiber and quinine; more than 95 per cent of our rubber and silk; nearly 90 per cent of our tin, measured in terms of the total amount consumed by us, came in 1937 from trans-Pacific lands. We must add to the foregoing figures 92 per cent of the tungsten imported and some 75 per cent of the mica, which came from the Oriental countries.

These figures for strategic materials can best be appreciated in their setting of total trade. In 1936, the last year of peace in the Far East, the United States secured 24 per cent of its total imports from the Far East proper, and an additional 3 per cent from India. We sent to the Far East proper 13.5 per cent of our total exports, and to India 1 per cent additional. These statistics represent trade of great significance to our industries and to employment in this country. They emphasize, moreover, the disproportionate importance of Far Eastern raw materials for our manufacturing and consumption. We should further specify that of imports from the Far East, our antimony comes chiefly from China, our chrome from the Philippine Islands, our mica from India. Then there is tin from Malaya, and, to a lesser extent, from the East Indies, Thailand and Burma; tungsten from China, and manila fiber for which no label is necessary. We are now cut off from quinine because its source is almost solely in the Netherlands East Indies, and from rubber coming mainly from Malaya and secondarily from the East Indies. Before nylon and the war, Japan provided almost all of our silk; and China has been sending almost half the wool that we import.

## Markets of Asia

This is not the place to expand upon the importance of Far Eastern markets for the manufactures of the West and for certain of our great raw materials such as oil and cotton. In recent years the exports of general machinery and of motor vehicles, leaving aside the extraordinary items of war supplies, have greatly increased. The Far East has been an important field of investment for the Dutch and to some extent for the British, French and Belgians. Ten per cent of our own investments abroad have been placed in the Orient. The prospects for expansion in the coming decades are moderately good. No one should expect a tremendously rapid advance in the economic activity of the Far Eastern peoples, because no miracle can suddenly raise the standard of living of half the world. The pressure of the vast but poor population upon the means of production is so insistent that it is hard to save the capital necessary for technical progress. Advance there has been and will be, but gradual rather than spectacular.

Nor should we forget that the countries of the Far East have important economic relations among themselves, as well as with us. We can see the significance of the Pacific Ocean trade if we record the percentage of total exports and total imports for each of several countries in its relation with Pacific neighbors. Our own figures, swollen by our great trade with Canada and with the west coast of Latin America, show that we have been sending 39 per cent of our exports to all countries of the Pacific area and have been receiving 48 per cent of our imports from them. Japan has been sending and receiving in the Pacific some 69 per cent of her trade; Malaya about 65 per cent; China more than 70 per cent; the Philippine Islands some 87 per cent; Thailand almost 75 per cent. The Netherlands East Indies, which have had important commercial connections not only with Holland but with Germany and other European states, nevertheless have been carrying on some 42 per cent of their trade within the Pacific. Somewhat comparable is the position of Indo-China with approximately 35 per cent of her trade lying in the Pacific area. Korea and Formosa, under the Japanese system, have about 98 per cent of their trade limited to the Pacific zone and most of it to Japan. All in all, the Pacific countries constitute among themselves a highly important trading area which requires peace and adequate co-operation for the prosperity of the whole region.



## 2. WESTERN EMPIRES

Japan has long been free of direct control by Western imperialism, but much of her policy is an exaggerated reaction to her own past experience of that imperialism, and to her emotional estimate of the character and aims of Western nations in the remainder of East Asia. China is still marked by white imperialism, not only on her frontiers but also in the foreign concessions of her leading cities and in the vestiges of extraterritoriality which long gave to Westerners independence from Chinese jurisdiction. Thailand escaped not long ago from the system of extraterritoriality and varied political controls imposed from the West; and even now her economic life, like that of China, is too heavily influenced by external financial powers.

All the other areas within our purview have been actually and legally under colonial systems. When, therefore, we speak of the Far Eastern peoples we are not able to consider fully independent nations, with the exceptions noted, but we must think also of the dominant Western powers. True, the Philippine Islands have been assured of their independence and have been permitted to practice a high degree of self-government under American tutelage. Furthermore, Burma and India have received large grants of governmental power though the British government has remained the ultimate sovereign. Pledges of complete self-government have been made but the British are reluctant to grant entire independence in view of their own important interests in those countries and of the considerable uncertainty as to the political and economic line which the native people will take. Indo-China and British Malaya, the former by the deliberate policy of France, the latter because of the peculiar mixture of populations and the small importance of the native Malaysians, plus the strategic and economic significance of the Singapore area, have remained under paternalistic administration directed from abroad. The intermediate stage of development in the Netherlands East Indies has been described above.

Western imperialism has been strongly challenged by the growth of nationalism in the Far East. It has been pushed into relatively small proportions in the case of China and has beat a complete formal retreat in Thailand. Burmese nationalism is very recent and appears to be more intense than stable. The nationalism of India has grown apace among the minority of the highly educated and is emotionally

acceptable to all the townsmen. It is, however, imperilled at the base by the strongly conflicting interests of the socio-religious communities and by the tendency of the Indians to group themselves around personalities rather than about policies. Nationalism in the Netherlands East Indies is not highly developed, but the ambitions and resentments of the more able Indonesians have required from the Dutch considerable compromise. With the intense feelings of the Filipino leaders we are more familiar. These comments are not intended to weaken our appreciation of the rightful claims of Far Eastern peoples to work out their own course of life and to develop themselves in the most suitable organization attainable. They merely suggest that nationalism provides no sure and automatic solution of the great problems of poverty, illiteracy, racial and communal divisions. Nor does it by its own emotions create the experience and habits of co-operation upon which effective government depends. A long process of education remains which should in several areas be a process of self-education.

## Challenge of New Forces

Western imperialism has been further weakened by strife within itself. Since 1918 the old-time rivalry of Central European empires against the established colonial domains of England, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal has not been apparent in the Far East. Superficially, therefore, the British, French, Dutch, and American positions in the East have stood without challenge from the West. In reality, however, German ambitions have merely been deferred in the hope of achieving first a European triumph; and meanwhile, Japan has been strongly encouraged by Germany to attack the remaining imperial colonies in the Far East.

During the 1920's there was much alarm over the program and progress of the Third International in the Orient. After the failure of Communism to gain influence in Central Europe, the chosen field of operations for the Third International was the colonial empires of the Far East. The Communists believed that economic and political motives could be combined in stirring up the Oriental populations against the Western imperialists. The tactics for the time being were to let Japan alone. The net accomplishments of the Communist undertakings were not great, with the partial exception of their share in the later stages of the Chinese national revolution. However, in



part through the Communist propaganda, several million Orientals have gained a more or less clear idea of the Marxist theories, particularly as they apply to financial and industrial exploitation. If the present war does not result in a fairly satisfactory political and economic situation, there will be in the accumulated distress an excellent opportunity for the revival of social revolutionary groups.

Soviet Russia has circumspectly kept aloof in these latter years from active communist enterprise in the Eastern countries. Moreover, for varying reasons, Russia has kept the peace with a hostile Japan and has remained on fairly good terms with a China which cast out the Russian agents of the 1920's. Whether Russia will at a later time resume an aggressive interest in Far Eastern affairs depends upon the course of war and power in Europe, as well as upon internal changes in Russia itself. There is no evidence within the Far Eastern setting as to what may be the ultimate Russian course. All that can be said is to record the Soviet restraint or even retreat from the stand taken twenty years ago.

### 3. JAPANESE AGGRESSION

The long cherished ambition of Japan to be the dominant leader of the Orient and to cast out all opposition from the established Western empires, has fallen afoul of rising nationalism in China and to some extent in the Philippines and further south. The Japanese have protested all along that they really did not wish to fight China and were forced to do so by circumstances against their will. These words have sounded insincere in our ears, but in reality they merely state the truth — that Japan desired China and the other neighboring lands to subordinate themselves to her in the large design which she cherished. Japan wished, without fighting, to be able to direct their policies and to employ their resources. In a slightly different dress it is the old story of the imperialism which delights in its own benevolence, and is blind to its violence and exploitation.

The Japanese aggression, which we expect to fail, has developed within the East an opposition to Japan which cannot easily be forced of the Orient, and to cast out all opposition from the established gotten. So many million Chinese have suffered severely in their own persons and homes, in their entire economic and political outlook, that reconciliation with Japan will be extremely difficult. For the present, however, the reaction of Oriental peoples against the first

modern attempt at an Oriental imperialism is a healthy sign. Not only has it provided the chief check to a dangerous military expansion, linked with the totalitarian program in Europe and the Western world, but also it provides a proving ground of hard experience for self-reliance among the rising nationalities.

Compared with the conflict of the Japanese and the Chinese, or the frictions between the Japanese and the peoples of Southeastern Asia, the remaining difficulties among Oriental populations are minor indeed. The Indonesians, the Thai, and others of the southeast dislike the commercial success and the money-lending power of the Chinese middle class among them. In Burma, moreover, there is an even greater hostility against the financially dominant Indians. It is possible that in coming decades the attempts of these new nationalists to assure their control, not only over Western economic interests but also over the Chinese immigrants, will result in a good deal of difficulty. China on her part is likely to advance still further in her recent course of protecting and supporting the interests of her nationals abroad. The commercial backwardness of the native peoples of Southeastern Asia is the root problem. Opportunity is offered not only for those who came from the West with capital, but even for humble Chinese merchants to attain great success in the cities of the southern seas.

### III. The Far East and a Just Peace

No one can foresee the military, political and psychological situation in the Far East at the close of the present war. But surely the effort to face with reasonable definiteness the problem of peace in that region is better than indifference or vagueness. At the very least this effort is a useful discipline of minds and attitudes; at best it may assist in the development of public opinion, which should in a democracy influence and support foreign policy.

Obviously, a world settlement cannot be planned without taking into adequate account the specific problems of the Far East. Neither can peace be planned for the Far East alone without ample reference to world relationships.

#### I. THE TRANSITION PERIOD

We assume that Japan and her allies will be defeated. Indeed it is only upon that assumption that we will have any voice in the settlement. The natural corollary of that defeat will be the disarmament of the defeated states and temporary policing as found necessary by the victorious United Nations.

Such policing would appear to be inevitable, though its practice should be carefully guarded against the tendency to continue coercion without making a true settlement, and against a similarly serious danger that one or more nations would employ the police power for imperialistic purposes. Statesmen should consider as their prime responsibility the merging of national armaments under international direction, in order that they might work genuinely toward the more broad and stable organization of peace that would be required.

For Japan, which has an artificially stimulated pride and a tradition of invincibility, defeat will be a supremely bitter experience. Probably it will occur in the midst of economic disaster. It is rightly expected that defeat will discredit the military régime of Japan and will result in fundamental questioning of its organization and policy. We may accept this view as a working outlook, but we should also realize that other developments may require unusually steady, just, and tactful treatment of a defeated Japan.

Although the Japanese public may question the basis of the state, their thought is likely to be clouded by violent emotions. They may hold responsible the "wicked combination of the entire world against

their unaided forces"; or they may center their feelings upon the unexpected failure of Germany; again they may put the blame largely upon individual officers who would spectacularly commit suicide to lend substance to this feeling.

Still more fundamental is the problem of Japanese leadership and ideas. Will they be adequate for a constructive program in the acute difficulties of such a situation? Here the balance of judgment is somewhat pessimistic and yet we should by our own attitudes give the best possible opportunity to those civilian elements in Japan who desire a moderate policy for their country. Such men will have to struggle against the strong social and military tradition in Japan which glorifies revenge as a motive. As victors, we of the United Nations must be careful not to contribute to the risks of a Japanese Hitlerism either by unfairness and misjudgment on the one side, or by laxity upon the other.

## 2. WORLD ORGANIZATION

While it is not our task here to sketch the plan of world-wide international agreement and organization, it is impossible to think of a just and durable peace in the Far East unless there is an adequate world organization initiated and supported by the United Nations, but promptly opened to the participation of all who are prepared to share in its responsibilities. The organization is needed to provide effectively and continually for:

- (a) The security of each nation from external attack.
- (b) The settlement of international disputes by peaceful adjustments.
- (c) The progressive prevention of armament for war, along with the development of an international force for the maintenance of order and the execution of the decisions of the international body.
- (d) The holding in common trust of certain areas disputed or unable at this time to maintain themselves as independent countries.
- (e) Assurance of access to raw materials and to markets for all nations prepared to cooperate sincerely in the international organization.
- (f) The improvement of economic conditions and the raising of living standards, particularly in the areas which are most in need of international assistance.

## Regional Federation

Besides the world-wide organization, there is a natural case to be made out for regional cooperation and organization in the Far East and in the Pacific area as a whole. It was the experience of the League of Nations that an international body centered in the Western world almost never found the time or the expert knowledge to face in a thorough manner the problems of the Far East. Moreover, the particular issues involving the resources and the peoples of Southeastern Asia and the great archipelagoes require the distinctive collaboration of the territories most concerned.

It is unwise to attempt a detailed blueprint. Rather we should point the way to helpful collaboration of the countries in the Far Eastern area, and of other states which are significantly related to them. China, Soviet Russia, the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands East Indies, India, the Philippine Islands, possibly Indo-China and Burma, to be joined whenever post-war conditions permit by Japan, Korea and Thailand, should attempt to work out together within the framework of a global international program their own specific regional agreements and organization for the purposes of common welfare outlined in the world-wide system.

There should be developed in the course of the next decade or two an Indonesian federation which could take its place beside China and Japan with or without Russia, India, and Australia, as true units of the Far Eastern grouping, from which anomalous European and American political interests would disappear. Moreover, there would be advantages in the immediate acceptance of the Indonesian federal idea as a framework for a broad and international treatment of the colonial and quasi-colonial areas of Southeastern Asia, along with the islands of the southwestern Pacific. Work on these lines should be undertaken promptly and, of course, on a cooperative basis.

### 3. THREE PRINCIPLES

There are three basic principles which are fundamental to an adequate peace settlement in the Far East.

a. Obviously, there should be a strong and independent China in full control of her recognized territory and strong enough to direct her own destiny. China may still have some danger from the encroachments of Japanese or of other imperialisms. Her problems at the close



of the war will be acute and her industrial base is inadequate for great military strength. It is well for China and for international relations that extraterritoriality and the foreign concessions in China have already been undermined in principle and in fact. These old complications and sources of friction should be promptly cleared away. Moreover, it would be well to agree at an early moment that Hong Kong, Kwangchowwan and Macao belong fully to China, subject to negotiation of details in their retrocession. If Hong Kong, like Guam, Singapore, and certain Japanese or other strategical sites, is needed as an air and naval base for international forces, the necessary facilities should be made available.

b. Japan should remain as a significant power able to take her proper place in the comity of nations. The Japanese people and their children have a right to live in proper relations with their neighbors as much as do any people in the world. Also, a Japan too greatly weakened would invite retaliation and encroachment from others. Japan's pressing economic needs should be met fairly, so long as Japanese policy will conform to the requirements of international organization. Even with the expected check to the extension of her empire, Japan's location and the character of her industries will still leave for her a real economic position in East Asia.

c. The important colonial areas of Southeastern Asia, notably Indo-China, Burma, Malaya, and the East Indies, should be held under international trusteeship in order to provide for their security, for the welfare of native populations, and for non-discriminatory policies regarding markets and raw materials. There is a strong case to be made for direct international administration in which Asiatic personnel should become increasingly important. If assignments of administration are made to particular powers, they should be limited in time and subject to strict review with various improvements of the mandate principle.

The United States should redeem its pledge of independence for the Philippines, with such further assistance to the security and economic welfare of the Islands as may be requested by the Philippine government and agreed to by the United States. Such arrangements should be directed neither toward isolation nor toward an indefinitely continuing bilateral relationship, but should look rather for useful association of the Philippines with international economic organization, particularly as such organization relates to the neighboring regions of Southeastern Asia.



The great size and importance of the Netherlands East Indies and their intermediate stage of development require special consideration. The comparatively satisfactory and semi-autonomous Dutch-Japanese administration might well remain in charge, with assurances for continued progress under general principles of international cooperation.

#### 4. RESTORATION OF CONQUERED LANDS

Proposals as to Japan's acquisitions outside her own borders must be considered, first of all, in the light of the true interests of the peoples whom she has conquered. To begin with, Japan should give up all military, political and economic positions which she has gained in the course of the war which began in July, 1937. Japan also should withdraw completely from Manchuria and from Formosa. In these two areas all Japanese claims, properties and interests should be returned to China. It seems impossible to distinguish between Japanese private holdings and those which are clearly public in nature, for the process of acquisition has been military or semi-military and has frequently been in the name of "national policy companies" which are partly governmental in capital and in direction. In view of the severe controversies that have raged for a generation over Japanese penetration of Chinese territory, it seems better to make a clean sweep and to start anew without a complex mass of pending problems.

The people of Korea have a strong claim in principle for independence and they should be transferred from Japanese control to international trusteeship in the interests of the Koreans themselves. Sympathetic but informed students of the Far East feel that the limited development which the Koreans have been permitted under Japanese domination is a critical handicap to their complete independence at this moment. Therefore, they need genuine assistance and protection while they seek the gradual progress of their own society.

These territorial changes should be closely linked with the handling of the problem of indemnities and financial claims. China should declare her moral and legal right to compensation for the tremendous damage suffered at the hands of the Japanese armed forces. However, China's recovery will be greatly aided by the reacquisition of Manchuria and Formosa, plus the Japanese establishments there

and in China proper. Japan, on the other hand, will find it very difficult to make substantial payments, the more so because her economy will be severely dislocated through the loss of Manchuria and Formosa. Thus it would seem to be statesmanship that all claim by China for additional indemnity be waived. Other powers might also declare their rights to compensation but waive them as a contribution to Japan's reconstruction and to the good will required for general settlement.

## 5. REORGANIZATION OF JAPAN

There is strenuous discussion in some circles as to whether the Japanese imperial system should be destroyed as a first condition of peace. It is argued with some force that for decades the military party of Japan has been able to use the popular devotion to the Emperor as the lever for applying the full strength of the nation against Japan's neighbors.

However, we prefer the sound principle of not interfering with the strictly internal affairs of Japan, except to the minimum degree required by the necessities of international society. The imperial house might well be a restraint upon the chaotic violence which is likely to be the chief obstacle to the development of a better government and sounder policy in Japan. There is much authority for the view that constitutional progress is more likely to be built upon the imperial tradition than to be created artificially amid a confused and resentful people whose Emperor had been torn from them. However, the peace, security and well-being of the world demand from all countries, Japan and the others alike, a respect for their neighbors and such direction of policy that other peoples may live without fear of aggression.

How can we secure a remaking of the Japanese Government unless we require it by force? One method of approach is to challenge the Japanese people themselves to prepare a constitutional and a national program which would be convincing evidence that military chiefs no longer control the state nor could easily regain control; that the resources freed from military employment would be directed toward the advance of internal welfare; that policies of education and information would be compatible with international peace.

No one can guarantee that such a challenge would be adequately met, but it is worthwhile to create the conditions most favorable to healthy developments among the Japanese themselves. If the attempt

should fail there can always be the ultimate resort to international economic and military action. A powerful inducement to the desired internal reorganization and shift to a policy of international cooperation could be found in the granting of loans and trade opportunities as prompt recognition of each actual step in the new way.

## 6. RELIEF AND REHABILITATION

There are further measures of welfare and adjustment which may contribute much to the success of the peace settlement. At the close of the war China, Japan, and perhaps other Far Eastern areas will be in economic distress. We must never forget that China and Japan were engaged in exhausting warfare which damaged and deformed their entire economic life for four and one-half years before Pearl Harbor. Emergency relief measures in supplies and credits would mean much in good will and in reducing the risks of internal conflicts which might block a prompt and stable settlement.

The long-time Japanese distrust of the economic power of Western countries will have been sharpened by the war and can be modified only by prompt and concrete demonstrations of a just policy. If the Japanese can have substantial reason to feel that they can build a policy for welfare rather than for power, we have hope of securing their cooperation. Otherwise, there is great danger of continual revolt against the program of the victorious nations. For varying but equally strong reasons, China and other areas will have urgent need for factual assurance that they can depend upon economic interchange with the United States and other trading countries.

The United States should revise its immigration laws and place China, Japan, and other Oriental lands on a quota basis. Other Pacific countries should be encouraged to liberalize their immigration policies and procedures in international agreements. When individuals do not feel that they are blocked in arbitrary and discriminatory fashion from pursuing their rightful interests, an important cause of international hostility is reduced.

The developments of the war, and particularly of Japan's financial policy in the territories which her army has occupied, require renewed effort for the regulation and progressive suppression of the traffic in narcotics. Tens of millions of people, discouraged and impoverished, find their whole future in jeopardy because of the organized temptation to seek relief in narcotics.

## A NOTE ON CHRISTIANITY IN THE FAR EAST

Among the countries here reviewed, the continuous development of Christianity dates from the eleventh century, when the Syrian Church is known to have been already established in India; followed by Roman Catholics in the sixteenth, moving from India on to the Philippines, China and Japan; and by Protestants, beginning late in the eighteenth century with India and entering other areas only in the nineteenth. Effective effort of modern type and scale is only fifty to a hundred years old; and much of the numerical development has come within the present century. Viewed absolutely, or viewed as the growth of the heaven, the progress of Christianity is most promising. Considered in relation to the enormous bulk of Oriental society, or in relation to the total influence of the established religions and of non-Christian customs and concepts, Christianity is an element minor indeed.

There are a full million of the Syrian Christians in India, half of them affiliated with Rome and half standing independent but in friendly contact with Protestants. Roman Catholics count nearly four million in India and likewise in China; fourteen million in the Philippines, including a million and a half of the offshoot Aglipayan or Independent Church of nationalist tendencies; considerable missions in Indo-China; lesser enterprises in the Japanese Empire and in the remaining Dutch, British and Thai territories. In the Philippines, and to a smaller extent in the other countries, the Catholic methods of listing and reporting differ from the Protestant procedures.

Protestant Christianity is numerically strongest in India, with nearly four million communicants (one per cent of the population, as is the case also in Burma and in the East Indies). Only in the Philippines does it exceed two per cent of the population, where there are nearly 400,000 communicants. The East Indies contain a highly important Protestant body, largely developed by Dutch and by German missionaries, which numbers over 600,000 communicants (baptized Christians 1,650,000, or two and one-half per cent of the population). In China, the 600,000 communicants are but one-seventh of one per cent of the nation; in Japan, 233,000 are three-tenths of one per cent; in Korea, 174,000 are three-fourths of one per cent. In Burma there are over 150,000 communicants. The

churches in Formosa, Manchuria, Indo-China, Thailand and Malaya are all very small. Before the war, the Protestant missionaries in India and the Far East proper numbered 14,000, of whom nearly 7,000 are at work today in India and in Free China.

India aside, Protestant communicants in the Far East are some 2,200,000, or three-tenths of one per cent of 700 million people. Including India, there are more than 6 million among 1,070 million, or six-tenths of one per cent. The same percentage applied to the people of the United States would mean a Protestant body well under one million. No one can expect young churches of this size, divided pitifully in the Protestant anarchy of denominationalism, to influence vastly the political and economic character of the societies in which they live. Yet six million Christians are more numerous than the members of any body of North American Protestants save the newly united Methodists, and they are not far from the total number of communicants in the United States on the eve of the Civil War. To the early church of the Mediterranean, they would have seemed the miracle of miracles.

The Christian churches of the Far East are marked by great concern for literacy and education. In India Protestant schools provide for 700,000 young people, and the percentage of literacy among Christians is nearly three times the general rate. They maintain wide services of healing — in China, 260 Protestant hospitals. They uphold high standards of family life and a better status for women. They carry on pioneer work for the unfortunate, the outcaste, the blind, the insane and the lepers. They develop international contacts and elements of an international outlook — and are, therefore, oppressed in Korea, Formosa and Manchuria, and suspected in Japan and among extreme nationalists in India.



## A WORD IN SUMMARY

Here, then, are half the people of the earth, marked by past and present imperialism. In Japan the old traditions of military feudalism have reacted to Western stimuli by creating an Asiatic imperialism of portentous violence. In China the struggle for national life is desperately hopeful. In India opposition to British rule is the incentive to untried nationalism. At varying stages of experience, the peoples of Southeastern Asia are aroused to self-consciousness.

Industrialization has been achieved by Japan alone of the entire group. She and others can prosper on the important condition of orderly, dependable and profitable exchange of raw materials and finished products. Only India appears to have within her own borders the resources for a great and enduring industrial future. In most of the Far East, peasant life and peasant problems are fundamental, even dominant elements in the whole picture.

For the vast colonial and semi-colonial areas, economic development has been too largely controlled by the needs and greeds of Western lands. Imperial benevolence is neither adequate nor trustworthy. Sound advance requires the complete or increasing autonomy of these lands, so that the interests and the will of the natural residents may work toward their own welfare.

Peace and international cooperation in the Far East are of the highest importance to the progress of the region, as they are also to world peace and world prosperity. The culture and the personal qualities of the Far Eastern peoples, many of them admirable, are ready to enrich a world that cares to appreciate them. Societies that can produce a Noguchi and a Kagawa; a General and a Madame Chiang Kai-shek; a Tagore, a Gandhi and a Nehru; to say nothing of their accumulated glories in art, philosophy and literature, are not in the outer darkness. In the peaceful interchange of the treasures of civilization, no less than by commerce in the riches of the earth, mankind can come to new abundance of life.

Does the world in your own mind and heart comprehend the Far East? Only so can it approach the roundness which science, education and Christian teaching should long since have made real.

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